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No right to liberty: the detention of asylum seekers for administrative convenience  
 
Helen O’Nions* 
Introduction: the climate of non-entrée  
The recent decision of Grand Chamber of the ECtHR to endorse short periods of detention for 
asylum seekers on the grounds of practicality and administrative convenience appears to 
legitimise the indiscriminate and increasingly restrictive asylum policies of Western Europe1. The 
conclusion that necessity is not a requirement for detention in the asylum process may well lead 
to a dramatic increase in the number of people detained for comparatively short-periods. Such a 
practice is not accepted within the criminal justice sphere - thus a lesser standard applies when 
dealing with asylum detention, reflecting a view that asylum seekers are ‘different’ or ‘others’ 
whose human rights are limited by reason of their flight. 
The reasons for the climate of restriction have been well-documented but should not be used to 
undermine the responsibility to provide sanctuary. Joseph Carens argues that there is a moral 
obligation which arises from the legitimacy of the nation-state system: 
“the legitimacy of any particular state is thus initially derivative from the legitimacy of the system 
as a whole”2. 
The nation-state system enables sovereign states to control their territory and exclude others; it is 
this process which generates refugees. As the nation seeks to firm up its identity those who do not 
fit neatly within that definition may find themselves excluded in a variety of  ways. This 
obligation becomes greater as more refugees are created and does not diminish as the burden on 
the receiving state grows. Further, one can argue that once a state makes a decision to deny entry 
or expel a refugee they become implicitly linked to that person’s destiny and become part of the 
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2 Carens, Joseph  “States and refugees: a normative analysis” in Adelman, Howard (ed) Refugee Policy. Canada and 
the US 1991 York Lanes Press, Toronto pp18-29 at 25. 
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causative chain. Even if one doubts any pre-existing moral responsibility to those who flee 
persecution, it could be argued that such an obligation must  arise when a decision is made to 
deny entry or to remove.  
Mathew Gibney argues for a more pragmatic obligation on states which recognises the demands 
of impartialists such as Carens but also understands that states have a duty to their own citizens 
and the political community that they inhabit. He reasons that there is a humanitarian obligation 
to those who constitute refugees which is owed to those in most need3. This obligation is not 
absolute as it depends on the ability of the host-state to accommodate those seeking protection. 
Michael Waltzer argues that it may be necessary for states to restrict entry in order to maintain 
their own political community4.  
In addition to any moral responsibility to admit refugees, which is certainly questioned by 
partialists, there is a legal right to seek and enjoy asylum enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and a commensurate obligation to afford refugee status where a 
person complies with the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees5.  
Nevertheless, non-entrée measures are increasingly used to prevent asylum seekers from 
accessing this legal right. The tough stance taken in Australia which has been well-documented 
appears to be finding favour in the US and Europe as an increasing number of people are detained 
in the absence of evidence that they pose a danger or that they may abscond. According to Frank 
Brennan: 
Detention of asylum seekers without visas has been used to transmit a double signal - warning other 
asylum seekers to take a detour to another country and luring voters who wish to take a tough stand 
against the ‘other’’6. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Gibney, Mathew The Ethics and Politics of Asylum 2004 Cambridge Univ. Press. 
4 Waltzer, Michael Spheres of Justice 1983 Basic Books, New York p35-40. 
5 The wording of Article 14 is unfortunate in that it is not supported by a corresponding duty on states to provide 
asylum and it therefore offers the asylum seeker little assurance of sanctuary, Lauterpacht, H International law and 
Human rights 1950 Frederik Praeger at 422. 
6 Brennan, Frank Tampering with Asylum 2003 Univ. of Queensland Press, St Lucia pxiii. 
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Whilst the European detention estate is growing7 it is also diversifying. Hathaway, identifies 
several states which avoid the use of prisons and dedicated immigration detention centres 
preferring to use reception centres to accommodate asylum applicants8. This is often a matter of 
semantics, for example in Denmark and Germany the reception centre stay is often compulsory. 
In the Netherlands, asylum seekers are typically detained at these reception centres for  the 
duration of their application. The government does not officially identify them as detention 
facilities as the occupants remain free to leave the country.  Other states, such as Austria will 
deny support to asylum applicants who elect to reside outside the designated accommodation. In 
Croatia, Law 109/2003 provides that an asylum seeker will be detained in the Centre for Asylum 
Seekers during the duration of the application process unless they have sufficient resources to live 
independently in which case they will be detained for seven days9.  
The Council of Europe’s Committee on the Prevention of Torture suggest that  conditions in these 
centres  may be  worse than those of prison establishments10. At the same time, several countries 
continue to use prisons to accommodate foreign nationals, including asylum applicants11. In the 
UK prisons may be used to detain immigration and asylum applicants despite UNHCR guidance 
that this should not occur. Officially the routine use of prisons ended following a government 
undertaking in October 2001 but it has been acknowledged that they will continue to be used in 
some cases where there may be a risk to security12. According to Home Office policy13, those 
                                                 
7 Jesuit Refugee Service Detention in Europe October 2004 JRS listed 218 facilities for detaining migrants and asylum 
seekers in European 23 countries. 
8 Hathaway, James The Rights of Refugees in International Law 2005 Cambridge University Press at 378-9 
9 Gluščić, Stjepan Report to support to promotion of  reciprocal understanding between the European union and the 
Western Balkans, National report, Justice and Home Affairs CEPOR (SME’s policy think tank centre) 2005 
http://www.cepor.hr/projekti/Justice.pdf 
10 CPT/Inf (2006) 11 Poland para 59; CPT/Inf (2006) 41 Greece;  see also European Parliament Resolution on the 
situation with refugee camps in Malta  
11 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Visit report: 
Ireland (2006) CPT/Inf (2007) 40; CPT/Inf (2007) 18 Visit report: Germany, para 49 Hamburg remand prison is used 
to detain male and female  foreign nationals with a view to expulsion alongside remand prisoners. 
12 David Blunkett HC deb. 25th Feb 2002 col. 442. 
13 Home Office Operational Enforcement Manual as of 2007, Chapter 38.10.1. 
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who engage in disruptive activities whilst in detention may be transferred to prisons14. In Poland, 
asylum seekers can be detained in a specific detention facility or a deportation prison for up to a 
year if they have made an application whilst illegally in Poland or awaiting deportation15.In 
addition, private prison service operators now run many of the immigration detention centres in 
the UK . According to research by Christine Bacon, these companies see immigration detention 
as a logical extension of their role and clearly perceive their involvement as “firmly within the 
penal sphere”16. 
 The detention of asylum-seekers is normally justified in order to facilitate impending expulsion 
or where there is a concern that the individual may abscond. As such it is compatible with Article 
5(1)f ECHR. However, recent times have seen a gradual departure from this justification to 
embrace detention for purely administrative purposes. As such the legal requirements to avoid 
arbitrariness and to act proportionately are threatened. The stage is being set for a move towards 
the Australian model of mandatory detention. In the UK, these moves began in the early 1990’s 
with the Conservative government’s perception that the country had become a ‘soft-touch’ for 
asylum seekers17. Similarly, the 1996 immigration reforms in the United States changed the 
direction of immigration policy in favour of increased restrictions and hostility by redefining 
persons who are not lawfully present as not yet admitted so as to deprive them of extended appeal 
rights18. Routine detention has recently been introduced against asylum-seekers arriving from a 
list of countries on the basis of generalised national security concerns19.  
                                                 
14 This was the case following the Yarlswood riots in 2004. 
15 Visit: Poland (2004) CPT/Inf (2006) 11 
16 Bacon, Christine “The evolution of immigration detention in the UK” RSC Working Paper no 27 2005 Refugee 
Studies Centre, Univ. of Oxford at2 
17 Young, Craig “Political representations of geography and place in the introduction of the U.K. Asylum and 
Immigration Act (1996)” in Nicholson and Twomey (eds) Current issues of UK Asylum Law and Policy 1998 Ashgate  
(1998) p34-51 at 43. 
18 “The US perspective” Paolo Morante 85-112 in Hughes, Jane  and Liebaut, Fabrice (eds) Detention of asylum 
seekers in Europe: analysis and perspectives  Kluwer 1998, The Hague at 92; see also Dow, Mark American Gulag. 
Inside US immigration Prisons 2004 Univ. of California Press, Berkeley and Welch, Michael Detained. Immigration 
Law and the expanding INS jail complex 2002 Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia. 
19 Human Rights Watch “US ‘Operation Liberty Shield’ Undermines Asylum seekers rights” March 27th 2003 
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Restrictive measures may be  explained  by the notion that asylum seekers ‘choose’ particular 
states, which they see as a ‘soft touch’ offering generous welfare packages. This is related to the 
inaccurate perception in the West that the majority of asylum seekers target European states  to 
seek protection20. Gibney observes that ‘from the early 1990’s Western countries seemed to fall 
like dominoes to the problem of asylum’21. Des Places attributes this response to the perceived 
problem of asylum shopping whereby asylum seekers select countries of destination based partly 
on a perception that they are more generous with their reception of asylum seekers. Applying 
regulatory competition theory, she argues that this fear led to a competitive restrictionism 
amongst states22. Whilst this may account for state responses, the restrictionist argument fails to 
take account of a diverse range of ‘pull factors’ which direct an asylum seeker to a particular 
country. Such factors include a common language, past colonial ties and geographical 
proximity23. In other cases, the choice of destination falls to  smugglers and traffickers rather than 
the individual applicant. Castles and Loughna point to a “multi-faceted ‘migration industry” 
which operates to influence the ‘decision’24.  
Whilst the numbers seeking asylum in the UK have decreased in recent years, it is doubtful 
whether this can be simply attributed to the increasing climate of restriction25. Research suggests 
that restrictionism has limited success in reducing the number of applicants. In 1992 Australia 
introduced mandatory detention for asylum seekers and yet the numbers continued to rise steadily 
until Australia closed its borders and rejected boat arrivals in Sept 200126. In the UK, the Home 
                                                 
20 Castles, S and Loughna, S note that Tanzania accommodated around 500,000 refugees in 2000 in “Trends in asylum 
migration to industrialized countries 1990-2001” in Borjas, G and Crisp, J Poverty, International Migration and 
Asylum 2005 Palgrave pp39-69 at 53. There is no doubt that those countries immediately surrounding areas of conflict, 
such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey have accommodated a far greater number of refugees.  
21 Gibney, Matthew Beyond the bounds of responsibility: western states and measures to prevent the arrival of refugees 
Global Migration Perspectives No 22 Jan 2005, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva at 6.  
22 Des Places, Ségolène Barbou Evolution of asylum legislation in the EU: insights from regulatory competition theory 
EUI Working Papers 2003/16 European University Institute, Italy.  
23 supra n20 at 61. 
24 supra n20 at 63. 
25 Zetter, Griffiths, Feretti and Pearl An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in Europe 1990-2000 July 2003 
Home Office Research Study. 
26 Field and Edwards Alternatives to detention of asylum seekers and refugees UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy 
Research Series POLAS/2006/03 April 2006 Appendix 1, Australia. 
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Office  undertook its own study which suggested that there is no correlation between  more 
restrictive policies and a decline in the number of asylum applicants27. Yet this remains a 
perception amongst many politicians. At the same time, there can be no doubt that increasing 
restrictionism prevents people from accessing the asylum process and may force many people to 
remain in danger. The measures aimed at targeting asylum abuse are indiscriminate in their 
application. 
In addition to well-publicised measures such as carriers liability, visa requirements and the 
stationing of immigration officers at overseas ports; we have begun to see a process of territorial 
contraction with the use of international zones which are considered to be outside the full 
jurisdiction of potential host states. Gibney notes: 
With only mild exaggeration one might say that a thousand little Guantanamos have been created in the 
last two decades: centres of power where states (and their formal and informal agents) act free from the 
constraints imposed on their activities by the courts, international and domestic law, human rights groups 
and the public at large28. 
 
Similarly the policy of interdiction is used to redirect asylum seekers to separate regions in order 
to process their claims. This received international attention  in the Tampa incident of 2001 where 
the asylum claimants were eventually directed by the Australian government to the pacific island 
of Naru to have their claims assessed29. Such developments threaten the legitimacy of 
international refugee law and have attracted criticism from the UNHCR: 
Many industrialized countries have increasingly ‘externalized’ their border controls, including through 
interception in the territorial waters or territory of third states with the latters’ permission and/or 
involvement. In some regions, asylum policies became increasingly control-oriented and seen as a sub-set 
of migration policies30. 
 
                                                 
27 Zetter et al supra n25. 
28 Gibney supra n21 at 9 notes that the original use of Guantanamo was to house Cuban and Haitain asylum seekers in 
the early 1990’s. 
29 Gibney supra n21 at 9. 
30 General Assembly EX Com of the High Commissioners programme 58th session “Note on international protection” 
A/AC.96/1038 29th June 2007 para 30. 
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Refugee advocates understand that there are few if any legal means of flight open to asylum 
seekers who are in need of protection31.  
James Hathaway argues: 
Instead of embracing the Refugee Convention’s solution of temporary protection, the response of developed 
states to the end of the interest-convergence between refugees and receiving States has been to avoid 
receiving claims to refugee status. Most Northern states have implemented non-entrée mechanisms, inc visa 
requirements on the nationals of refugee-producing states, carrier sanctions, burden shifting 
arrangements, and even the forcible interdiction of refugees at frontiers and in international waters. The 
simple purpose of non-entrée strategies is to keep refugees away from us32. 
 
In her  critique of international refugee law, Patricia Tuitt has argued that the definition of 
refugees and asylum-seekers in Western Europe has been both racialised and criminalised 
through the use of detention and entry controls33. The focus on the racial or ethnic origins of the 
refugee can then be used to argue that mass migration is economic at its source34. Furthermore 
she contends: 
Being thus pragmatically focused, international refugee law constantly turns away from the needs of the 
refugee and towards the sovereign interests of Western states…this has resulted in an irreparable conflict 
between international refugee law and the refugee35. 
 
Tuitt believes that the domination of the Geneva Convention conception of refugee has allowed 
us to marginalise and exclude those who do not fit neatly within this definition, labelling them as 
undeserving, bogus claimants36. This exclusion is justified by reference to the increasing resort to 
forged documents and traffickers without cognisance of the causative factors 37.  
Whilst governments may see some success in tightening entry procedures, Michael Samers 
adopts a virtualist perspective to argue that  illegal immigration may in fact be created and 
                                                 
31 This was expressly acknowledged by the Home Office Minister, Lord Rooker, in January 2002 HL debates Hansard 
23rd January 2002 Col 1462. 
32 Hathaway, James Reconceiving International Refugee Law 1997 M Nijhoff , The Hague pxx. 
33 Tuitt, Patricia The Law’s Construction of the Refugee 1996 Pluto London at 19-20. 
34 ibid. at 19. 
35 ibid. at 23. 
36 ibid. at 146. 
37 ibid. at 148. 
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encouraged by these stricter regulations and the notion of immigration as ‘potentially dangerous’ 
which has helped to close off legal routes38. 
The extended use of detention, whilst not strictly a non-entrée measure itself may appear to be 
part of a package of measures aimed at deterring asylum seekers from seeking refuge39. The 
typical rationale for detention in Europe has been to effect deportation or removal when the 
individual is not compliant40. This would appear to satisfy any concerns regarding necessity and 
proportionality. However, the recent move towards more routine use of detention may be viewed 
in part as deterrence-based. Such a rationale for detention is expressly prohibited by international 
law and one should expect to find that when detention is employed its use is restricted to 
situations where it is deemed to be ‘necessary’ and proportionate to the legitimate objectives (as 
prescribed by domestic and international law). 
  
International law on the detention of asylum seekers 
Although Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a right to seek 
asylum, it is clear from international human rights law that there is no right to enter a state or a 
right to be granted asylum. There are some limitations provided in terms of removals and the 
principle of non-refoulment but these provisions fall well short of any state obligation to 
recognise an individual as a refugee41.  
In order to understand the nature of international obligations in this area it is necessary to 
consider  both international refugee law and human rights law. Article 31(1) of the Geneva 
Convention prohibits penalties applied to refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence 
where they present themselves to the authorities without delay and show good cause for their 
illegal entry or presence. Indeed, Hathaway notes that Article 31 “denies governments the right to 
                                                 
38 Samers, M “An emerging geopolitics of ‘illegal’ immigration” EJML 2004 Vol 6 27-45 at 29. 
39 Goodwin-Gill “Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees: non-penalization, detention and 
protection” pp185-258 in Feller, Türk and Nicholson Refugee protection in international law 2003 UNHCR at 225. 
40 Hughes and Liebaut supra n18 at 21. 
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subject refugees to any detriment for reason of their unauthorized entry or presence in the asylum 
country”42. As the object of the provision is to prevent punishment for illegal entry, Goodwin-
Gill adopts a broad interpretation of  ‘penalty’ to  encompass detention43. However, it also seems 
clear that a brief  period of detention pending an investigation is not defined as a  penalty within 
Art 31 but is merely an administrative measure44. Hathaway notes that detention prior to 
regularization does not constitute a penalty within Article 31(2)45. Regularization occurs when 
the asylum applicant has satisfied the formal requirements for verification of refugee status. This 
suggests that once an applicant has complied with the procedural requirements of the refugee 
determination procedure any further detention would constitute a penalty unless defined as 
‘necessary’46. Grahl-Madsen argues that detention can be employed in order to ascertain identity 
and to assist the investigation but it is limited by the requirement of necessity47. He specifically 
rules out the legitimacy of detention for administrative convenience48. The requirement for an 
individual assessment is of paramount importance. The UNHCR’s commentary suggests that 
restrictions on movement should only occur when necessary and then should be afforded a 
narrow interpretation49. Article 31(2) requires that restrictions should be:   
? Be prescribed by law 
? Be necessary 
? Not be discriminatory 
? Be applied only until status is regularised or until the person obtains admission 
elsewhere50. 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam The Refugee in International Law 2007 OUP at 366. 
42 Hathaway supra n8 at 410 
43 Goodwin-Gill supra n39 at 195. 
44 Giakoumopoulos, Christos “Detention of asylum seekers in the light of Art 5 of the ECHR’ in Hughes and Liebaut 
supra n18 pp161-182 at 165.  
45 Hathaway supra n at 418 
46 Gill and McAdam supra n41 at 462. 
47 Grahl-Madsen, Atle The Status of Refugees in International Law Sijthoff, Leiden 1972 at 148. 
48 ibid. at 150. 
49 Landgren, Karin “Comments on the UNHCR position on detention of refugees and asylum seekers” in Hughes and 
Liebaut supra n18 pp141-160 at 146. 
50 Field supra n26 para 74. 
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On first glance, the international refugee law obligations may appear more demanding than those 
of international human rights law51 as  they specifically require necessity rather than simply a 
lack of arbitrariness52. Ultimately, such an assessment will depend on the interpretative reach of 
arbitrariness. 
 
The concept of arbitrariness  
The notion that detention should not be arbitrary is well rehearsed in international human rights 
and refugee law. The UNHCR’s guidelines on detention of asylum seekers state that freedom 
from arbitrary detention is a ‘fundamental human right’53. Article 9 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights provides, inter alia, that no-one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or 
detention and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment no 8 on the Right to Liberty and 
Security of Persons, specifically includes immigration control54.This does not make all 
immigration detention per se unlawful but, as Edwards argues, it requires the decision-maker to 
consider alternatives such as sureties and reporting mechanisms prior to detention55. In A v 
Australia, the Human rights committee specifically linked necessity to the assessemnt or 
arbitrariness: 
“…remand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all circumstances of the case, 
for example to prevent flight or interference with evidence: the elemnt of proprotionality becomes relevant 
in this context”56 
 This is particularly the case when the applicant has a specific vulnerability, such as a psychiatric 
illness, as confirmed by the Human Rights Committee in C v Australia57.   
                                                 
51 Article 9 ICCPR and Article 5(1) ECHR. 
52 Cf Goodwin-Gill and McAdam supra n41 at 463 
53 UNHCR Revised guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum seekers Feb 
1999 UNHCR para 1. 
54 HRC General Comment No 8 Right to Liberty and Security of Persons (Art 9) 30th June 1982 para 1. 
55 Edwards, Alice “Human rights, refugees and the right ‘to enjoy’ asylum” 17 IJRL (2005) 293-330 at 319 
56 A v Australia Communication No 560/1993 CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 
57 Communication No 900/1999 CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 
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It is contended that this is not simply an assessment of legality but is broader and should be 
defined as ‘substantive arbitrariness’ to include decisions which are unreasonable, unjust, delayed 
and unpredictable58. Detention may thus be lawful but nevertheless arbitrary and could then 
constitute a breach of Article 959. Art 12 ICCPR protects the freedom of movement of those 
‘lawfully’ within the state’s territory. Asylum applicants are regarded as being ‘lawfully resident’ 
by the Human Rights Committee for the purpose of this provision60. Art 12 (3) stablishes that 
restrictions on freedom of movement must be provided by law and be necessary to protect 
national security, public order, health or morals or rights and freedoms of others.A restriction is 
therefore necessary when its severity and intensity are proportional to one of the purposes listed 
in this article and when it is related to one of these purposes61. 
The definition of arbitrary detention is informed by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention which was established in 1991 by the UN Human Rights Commission to investigate 
situations of arbitrary detention. In December 1998 the Working Group set out criteria for 
determining whether custody is arbitrary62.  Their 1998 report on the UK expressed concern over 
the lack of judicial oversight and emphasised that detention should only be used when legitimate 
according to international standards and where other measures will not suffice63. The report lists 
14 criteria which could be used to determine whether custody is arbitrary – these criteria only 
apply once a decision to detain has been made in accordance with the law, thus the issue of 
necessity is not explored in this context. However, the report recommends that alternative and 
non-custodial measures, such as reporting requirements, should always be considered before 
                                                 
58 Commission on Human Rights On right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile UN 
Doc.E/CN.4/826/Rev.1 paras23-30. 
59 Van Alphen v Netherlands No 305/1988 UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (1990). 
60 Celepi v Sweden Communictaion No 456/1991 CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991 
61 Nowak, M UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- CCPR Commentary 1993 Engel Verlag, Kehl am Rhein, 
Strasbourg p211; Goodwin-Gill supra n39 at 223. 
62 Report of the Working Group UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/63 18th Dec 1999. 
63  Commission on Human rights 55th Session Civil and Political rights, including torture and detention “Report of the 
Working Group on arbitrary detention” E/CN.4/1999/63 18th Dec 1998. 
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resorting to detention64 and that: “the detaining authorities must assess a compelling need to 
detain that is based on the personal history if each asylum seeker”65. 
One UK non-governmental refugee organisation, Bail for Immigration Detainees (BID), provided 
a submission to the UN Working group on arbitrary detention in Sept 2002:  
From our experience of detention and bail procedures BID is forced to conclude that detention is employed 
in the UK as a deterrent to those seeking asylum. Furthermore, the lack of procedural safeguards leads to 
widespread arbitrary detention. This submission offers recommendations to end this unlawful practice66. 
 
The Executive Committee’s Conclusion on detention of refugees and asylum seekers in 198667 
emphasised the need for necessity to be related to one of the legitimate aims stated; these aims 
have now been updated by the 1999 Guidelines which describe detention as ‘inherently 
undesirable’68. The introduction to the guidelines emphasises the need for necessity in all cases. 
Guideline 2 cites Article 14 UDHR and states the general principle that ‘asylum seekers should 
not be detained’69. The exceptions to this principle must be prescribed by law and should only be 
applied following consideration of all the alternatives70. They are contained in guideline 3: 
? To ascertain identity 
? To determine the elements on which the claim is based, but not for the duration of the 
decision-making process or indefinitely 
? In cases of bad faith where the asylum seeker has destroyed travel documents or has used 
fraudulent documents intentionally to mislead the state authorities 
? To protect national security or public safety 
                                                 
64 ibid. recommendation 8, para 33. 
65 ibid. 9, para 34. 
66 Bail for Immigration detainees Submission to the UN Working group on arbitrary detention Sept 2002 Executive 
summary. 
67 Ex Com Conclusion 44 (XXXVII) 1986 A/AC.96/688. 
68 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards for the detention of asylum seekers UNHCR 1999 
para 1. 
69 ibid. 
70 The possible alternatives include regularly reporting and monitoring mechanisms, provision of a surety or guarantor, 
release on bail and open accommodation centres:  Guideline 4. 
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The 2nd exception might be interpreted to provide justification for short-term, administrative 
detention but it is clear from the accompanying paragraph that it is only envisaged for a 
temporary period for the purpose of a preliminary interview.  Furthermore: 
 …it would not extend to a determination of the merits or otherwise of the claim. This exception to the 
general principle cannot be used to justify detention for the entire status determination procedure, or for an 
unlimited period of time. 
 
According to the UNHCR’s interpretation of the international legal position, detention outside 
these exceptions is contrary to accepted legal norms. The scope of arbitrary detention was 
discussed by the Executive Committee in a Standing Committee71. Their definition suggests a 
broad, purposive approach: 
…detention of asylum seekers may be considered arbitrary if: it is not in accordance with the law; if the 
law itself allows for arbitrary practices, or is enforced in an arbitrary way; when it is random or 
capricious or not accompanied by fair and efficient procedures for its review. It may also be arbitrary if it 
is disproportionate, or indefinite…For detention not to be arbitrary it should be prescribed by law that is 
sufficiently accessible and precise, and it should not include elements or inappropriateness or injustice72. 
 
Furthermore, the Committee concluded, inter alia: 
“Arbitrary detention of asylum-seekers and refugees occurs when they are detained for 
insufficient reason, without adequate analysis of their individual circumstances…”73. 
In relation to Art 31(2), the expert roundtable organised by the UNHCR in Geneva 8-9th Nov 
2001confirmed the exceptional nature of detention and required individualised assessments: 
 the detention of refugees and asylum-seekers is an exceptional measures and should only be applied in the 
individual case, where it has been determined by the appropriate authority to be necessary in the light o the 
circumstances of the case and on the basis of criteria established by law in line with international refugee 
and human rights law. As such, it should not be applied unlawfully and arbitrarily and only where it is 
necessary for the reasons outlined in Ex Comm 44 in particular for the protection of national security and 
public order…74. 
  
More recently, the UNHCR has avoided being prescriptive on the subject. EX Com No 93 (LIII) 
2002 on reception of asylum-seekers in the context of individual asylum systems requires merely 
                                                 
71 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s programme Standing Committee Detention of asylum-seekers and 
refugees: the framework, the problem and recommended practice EC/49/SC/CRP.13 4th June 1999. 
72 ibid. para 10. 
73 ibid. para 25. 
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that states respect human dignity and applicable human rights law when choosing a suitable 
reception arrangement. The Conclusion does not address the specific issues arising in the context 
of detention in reception centres and appears to allow states a degree of latitude when making 
such assessments75. 
 
It is commonly understood that approach of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR 
should inform the Council of Europe institutions when interpreting the ECHR. Indeed Article 53 
of the ECHR expressly recognises the importance of international human rights obligations. 
Furthermore, Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires an 
interpretation which is consistent with other international law obligations, thus necessity, 
proportionality and lack of arbitrariness must be key aspects in the interpretation of Article 5(1)f 
of the Convention. 
The Council of Europe has also engaged with the issue of detaining asylum seekers and has 
offered recent clarification on the subject of arbitrary detention. Recommendation Rec. (2003) 5 
On measures of detention of asylum seekers establishes the circumstances in which detention can 
be justified. The list is exhaustive: 
? When their identity, including nationality, has in case of doubt to be verified, in particular 
where travel or identity documents have been destroyed 
? When elements on which the asylum claim is based have to be determined which, in the 
absence of detention, could not be obtained 
? When a decision needs to be taken on their right to enter the territory of the state 
concerned, or 
? When protection of national security and public order so require76. 
                                                                                                                                                 
74 para 11b in Feller et al supra n39 at256 . 
75 EX Com No 93 (LIII) 2002 on reception of asylum-seekers in the context of individual asylum systems para b, i and 
vi; Landgren supra n49 at 150. 
76 para 3. 
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In A v Australia, the Human Rights Committee specifically required that the detention be justified 
on an individual basis:    
the fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other factors particular to 
the individual, such as likelihood of absconding and lack of cooperation, which may justify detention for a 
period. Without such factors detention may be considered arbitrary, even if entry was illegal77 (my 
emphasis) 
 
The UNHCR have also emphasised the need for the ‘detaining authorities must assess a 
compelling need to detain that is based on the personal history of each asylum-seeker’78. This 
approach is also found in the C/E recommendation which requires that these cases are dealt with 
on their individual merits and that detention should be necessary in each case: 
Measures of detention of asylum seekers should be applied only after a careful examination of the necessity 
in each individual case. Those measures should be specific, temporary and non-arbitrary and should be 
applied for the shortest possible time 
 
and furthermore: 
Alternative and non-custodial measures, feasible in the individual case, should be considered before 
resorting to measures of detention79. 
 
The consideration of alternatives to detention is a recurrent theme in the international soft law80. 
The UNHCR’s Executive Committee has provided that the power to detain must be defined 
clearly and narrowly and that there should be an individual assessment of the suitability of 
detention with a consideration of the alternatives81. According to Ophelia Field, the consideration 
of non-custodial alternatives is a ‘pre-requisite for satisfying the principle of necessity in relation 
to lawful detention’82. Arbitrariness may also occur where an applicant is denied adequate 
                                                 
77 1997 Comm 560/1993 3rd Apr 1997  para 9.4, also discussed by Tootell, Hughes and Petrasek “The relevance of key 
UN instruments for detained asylum seekers” in Hughes and Liebaut supra n18 at189. 
78 supra n81 at para 26(b). 
79 C/E Recommendation Rec. (2003) 5 On measures of detention of asylum seekers para 6. 
80 Although there is little hard law providing state obligations in this field. 
81 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s programme “Detention of asylum-seekers and refugees: the 
framework, the problem and recommended practice” Standing Committee 15th Meeting 4th June 1999 
EC/49/SC/CRP.13 para 14. 
82 Field supra n26 para 70. 
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reasons for the detention, this obligation is continuous in that the detention may become unlawful 
if the reason given initially ceases to apply83. 
                                                
Thus, according to international soft law, for a decision to satisfy the absence of arbitrariness test, 
it should be based on the individual circumstances of the applicant and should proceed from a 
consideration of alternatives which are found to be inappropriate in the applicant’s case. 
Article 5 ECHR contains the presumption of liberty and any interference must be for one of the 
specific purposes only. The detention must be lawful in that it is prescribed by law, complies with 
the rule of law and it should avoid arbitrariness84. In the cases of Amuur v France and Shamsa v 
Poland a lack of clarity regarding the process of detention violated the requirements that the 
procedure was prescribed by law85. 
Generally, the exceptions to Article 5 are narrowly construed by the Strasbourg authorities. The 
ECtHR has insisted that effective and regular judicial supervision is a key element of detention in 
the criminal justice process. In Brogan v UK86, the detention of terrorism suspects for periods of 
four and seven days was held to breach the requirement for suspects to be bought promptly before 
a judicial authority87. It is also clear that there must be reasonable grounds for suspicion before a 
person can be detained.  Similarly if a person of ‘unsound mind’ is to be detained there must be a 
medical assessment of necessity to ascertain that the person is suffering from a mental illness88. 
The need to consider all the alternatives to detention has been emphasised by the ECtHR in Litwa 
v Poland89 concerning the detention of alcoholics under Article 5(1)e. The court made it clear that 
the purpose of Article 5 was the prevention of arbitrariness90. They also held that: 
The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, less severe 
measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest 
which might require that the person concerned be detained. That means that it does not suffice that the 
 
83 Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413 . 
84 Clayton, Gina Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law OUP 2004 at 433. 
85 App No 19776/92 of 25th June 1996 and App Nos 45355/99 and 45357/99 of Nov 27th 2003 respectively. 
86 Brogan v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 117 
87 Article 5(1)3 ECHR. 
88 Cornelisse supra n165 at105. 
89 App No 26629/95 4.4.2000. 
90 para 73. 
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deprivation of liberty is executed in conformity with national law but must also be necessary in the 
circumstances91(my emphasis). 
 
The right to liberty is limited by Article 5(1)f which allows detention in two situations i) to 
prevent the person from unauthorised entry into the UK ii) where an action of removal is to be 
affected. In the latter scenario, it has been clear since the decision of the ECtHR in Chahal v UK 
that detention does not  need to be ‘necessary’ although it is also clear that detention can only be 
justified if the removal proceedings are in progress and are being processed with due diligence92. 
 
Recent developments in the EU 
Following the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the European Union has become increasingly active 
in the asylum field. An explicit right to asylum is contained in Article 18 of the non-binding 
Charter on Fundamental Rights but, when implemented, this will not add to existing human rights 
standards93. 
Since January 2005, the Directive on the Reception of Asylum Seekers should have been 
transposed into the domestic law of all member states94.  The directive addresses the issue of 
detention but stops short of imposing detailed obligations on states. Most significantly, Article 
7(2) allows member states to decide on the asylum seeker’s residence for reasons of public order, 
public interest or ‘where necessary for the swift processing and effective monitoring of 
applications’. The original proposal explained that this provision should rule out the detention of 
applicants simply because they are applicants, which would suggest that administrative simplicity 
should not be the determinative factor in detention95. When the directive was considered by the 
House of Lords Select Committee in 2001 the issue of necessity was raised: “At the very least, 
                                                 
91 para 78. 
92 Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413 at 464-466. 
93 Art 51(2) which states that the charter does not establish any new power or task for the community or union. 
94 2003/9/EC of 27th January 2003. For analysis see ECRI The EC Directive on the Reception of Asylum Seekers: 
Are asylum seekers in Europe receiving material support and access to employment in accordance with European 
legislation? AD3/11/2005/EXT/SH.  
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restriction should only be implemented when strictly necessary”96. Yet the issue of necessity 
is not tied to the individual applicant’s case and the UNHCR have expressed criticism of this 
provision and its potential for broad interpretation97. 
Alternatively, lesser restrictions on movement, such as a designated region of residence, are 
foreseen by Article 7(3) and in these cases administrative convenience may be a factor98. The 
final text watered down the initial proposal which advocated the consideration of alternatives 
before any restriction on movement. In terms of the conditions of detention, the directive is 
notably silent apart from para 10 which requires that the reception of applicants in detention 
should be designed to meet their needs in that situation 
In addition to the reception directive, a directive on Minimum procedures for the Granting and 
withdrawing of Refugee status99 was established which says little on the subject of detention. 
Article 18 merely requires that member states should not detain a person for the sole reason that 
they are an asylum applicant and requires access to a speedy judicial review100. The directive 
generated a great deal of criticism by refugee groups101 and the UNHCR has been critical of 
efforts to harmonize asylum procedures, especially the increasingly restrictive aspects which may 
breach international standards102. More specifically, the UNHCR has cautioned strongly against 
the use of a list of ‘safe countries’ without an assessment of individual risk103. 
                                                                                                                                                 
95 Brussels, 3.4.2001 COM(2001) 181 final 2001/0091 (CNS) Proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum 
standards on the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States (presented by the Commission) Article 7(2). 
96 HL European Union select Committee 8th session “Minimum standards for reception conditions of asylum seekers – 
with evidence” Nov 2001. 
97 UNHCR Annotated Comments on Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27th January 2003 laying down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers May, 2007 UNHCR. 
98 Mitsilegas, Valsamis “The directive on the reception of asylum seekers and its implementation in the UK” IANL 
2996 Vol. 20(1) p42-45 at 44. 
99 2005/85/EC 1st Dec 2005. 
100 2005/85/EC 1st December 05 Article 18. 
101 ECRE Press releases  30th Sept 03, 29th March 04 . 
102 UN GA Ex Comm of High Commissioners 55th session “Note on International Protection” A/AC.96/989 July 7th 
2004 para 15. 
103 UNHCR ‘Note on International protection’ UN Doc A/AC.96/975 2nd Jul 2003 para 12. 
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The use of generalised assessments of safety is relevant to the debate on detention, as it may be a 
chief factor in the decision to detain following the designation of the case as clearly  un-
founded104. 
Art 27 requires states to ensure an individual case by case assessment of safety of particular states 
but in fact member states are able to develop their own approaches on this question and it 
specifically permits national designation105. In addition, Article 29 empowers the European 
Council to draw up a list of safe countries of origin; member states are expected to deem those 
countries as safe and may add to but not subtract from this list. Annex II provides the criteria 
‘…it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Art 9’. 
The generalised approach of the directive is certainly problematic in the light of the prohibition 
on non-refoulement. In particular there is concern that it may result in refugees in orbit or ‘chain 
refoulement’106. 
In 1995, the Commission issued a proposal for a new directive on common standards and 
procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals107. The proposal is directed at 
ensuring speedy removal from the European area and includes provision for a European re-entry 
ban. Article 14 endorses temporary custody but only where ‘there are serious grounds for 
believing that there is a risk of absconding’ and where less coercive measures can not be applied. 
Temporary custody is subject to judicial supervision but may be extended to a max of 6 
months108. Whilst it is envisaged that such custody will be in specialised detention facilities, there 
                                                 
104 Young supra n17 at45 criticises the UK’s designation of Nigeria as ‘safe’ after the murder of the Ogoni activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa. 
105 Art 27(2)b. Art 30. 
106 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam supra n41 at 397 and p400;  ECRE ‘Broken promises’ June 2004; Tuitt supra n33 at 
111; Trost, Rachel and Billings, Peter “The designation of ‘safe’ countries and individual assessment of asylum claims” 
pp73-99 in Nicholson and Twomey supra n17. 
107 Proposals for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in 
member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals COM(2005) 391 Final 1st Sept 2005 
108 Article 14 
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is nevertheless recognition, despite extensive international criticism, that as a last resort, it may 
also be provided in the prison system109. 
The European Union has become very active in maintaining its external frontiers by funding 
initiatives on the periphery of Europe to detain and remove asylum applicants. One such location 
is Ukraine where an estimated 40,000 people per annum travel illegally to the EU. The conditions 
in these centres are miserable and do not attract the same degree of scrutiny as those in EU 
states110.  
There are mixed messages coming from the various European political institutions. The  
European Parliament has recently labelled European immigration policy as a failure, highlighting 
the number of  migrants that have died in the Mediterranean trying to enter the EU 111. The 
Resolution on the common immigration policy112, states that, inter alia, detention is contrary to 
the Geneva Convention and that administrative detention is leading to serious breaches of  human 
rights113. 
Some commentators have called for an enlightened approach to immigration and asylum using 
Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the European Community which prohibits any discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality. This would only allow distinctions in treatment to be permitted in 
the interests of immigration control if they are proportionate and justified. In cases where 
fundamental rights are at stake then distinctions should be prohibited without the option of 
justification114. A draft directive On minimum guarantees for individual freedom, security and 
justice in relation to decisions regarding movement of persons was proposed by the Standing 
Committee of Experts in International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law in 2004. The 
draft directive suggested prohibiting discrimination in the use of detention as well as entry control 
                                                 
109 Article 15 
110 BBC news “Ukrainian detention centre” Friday 13th Dec 2002; see also Make Borders History Campaign “No 
Border camp. Ukraine” August 2007 
111 para L 
112 European Parliament Resolution on the common immigration policy B6-0508/2006 26th Sept 2006 
113 paras 11,12  
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and removal115. It also provides for basic protections such as legal representation including free 
legal aid where needed and far greater judicial control of administrative immigration decisions116. 
The premise of the directive is the need to protect liberty, security and free movement in contrast 
to the minimum standards directive. It is based on the codification of existing standards in 
community law, notably the Charter on Fundamental rights and European Convention case law.  
 
Playing the definitions game 
Some states have re-defined the detention of asylum seekers in an attempt to avoid international 
obligations and criticism. Instead detention may be chracterised as a restriction on movement 
which may engage Protocol 4, Article 2 ECHR117. In Germany, asylum seekers may be held at 
international airports until a decision is reached118. The authorities argue that this is not detention 
as the individuals are free to return to their country of origin or a transit country. Nevertheless, 
the same practice was held to constitute a deprivation of liberty within Article 5 ECHR in Amuur 
v France concerning four Somali nationals who had been held at Paris-Orly airport119. The 
French government had argued they were not detained on French territory but were in an 
‘international zone’ and therefore the Article 5 obligations did not apply. It was also suggested 
that there was no deprivation of liberty as the men were free to return to a safe country. A 
distinction may be drawn between a deprivation of liberty which engages Article 5 and a 
restriction on movement which falls within Article 2 of Protocol 4. In Raimondo v Italy120 the 
applicant was suspected of involvement with the Mafia. He had been confined to his home in the 
evenings and had to inform the police when he planned to leave. However, he did not require 
                                                                                                                                                 
114 Boeles, Pieter “Editorial: fair and effective immigration procedures in Europe?” 2005 EJML Vol. 7 pp213-218 at 
218. 
115 Articles 1, 2. 
116 Boeles, Brouwer, Woltjer and Alfenaar “Draft directive on minimum guarantees for individual freedom, security 
and justice in relation to decisions regarding movement of persons”  2005 EJML Vol. 7 pp301-319. 
117 Mole, Nuala and Harby, Catharina Immigration, Asylum and detention ECRE, AIRE Centre June 2004 
118 Wilkinson, Ray “Europe: the debate over detention” Refugees Magazine, UNHCR  Issue 113. 
119 (1996) 22 EHRR 533 
120 [1994] 18 EHRR 237 
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permission to leave his home and therefore this engaged the 4th protocol rather than Article 5. 
The protection offered by Article 5 is far greater than that of the 4th protocol which only applies to 
persons lawfully within the territory of the state. Thus, if short-term detention is defined as 
merely a restriction on movement it would legitimise its routine use against asylum-seekers. The 
Amuur decision and the legal rationale for the decision in Raimondo suggest that this is not the 
case. Asylum applicants are typically detained in an environment which they are not free to leave 
ntion and in many cases there is evidence that 
tion or removal centre the 
 does not signal a change of function for such centres. They will remain designated places of detention for 
the purposes of the Immigration Act. Similarly, it does not signal a change to the powers to detain122. 
by simply giving notice. 
The UNHCR’s Executive Committee has noted that the use of such temporary accommodation 
without adequate facilities constitutes de facto dete
may suggest inhuman and degrading treatment121. 
In the UK, detention centres were renamed reception and removal centres in the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, although the function of the centres remains the same. It 
seems clear that whether the centre is described as an accommoda
obligations to avoid arbitrariness remain. According to Lord Bassam: 
It
 
The power to detain asylum seekers in the UK 
The power to detain was originally confined to cases of impending removal by Schedule 2 of the 
Immigration Act 1971 as amended by s140(1) Immigration and Asylum Act (IAA 1999) and 
s73(5) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIAA 2002). This power was extended 
by s62 of NIAA 2002 to provide a free-standing power for the Secretary of State to authorise 
                                                
detention in cases where there is a power to issue removal directions.  
 
121
22nd July 2002. 
 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s programme “Detention of asylum-seekers and refugees: the 
framework, the problem and recommended practice” Standing Committee 15th Meeting 4th June 1999 
EC/49/SC/CRP.13 para 20. There now appears to be international consensus that such transit zones are places of 
detention - Giakoumopoulos, Christos “Detention of asylum seekers in the light of Art 5 of the ECHR’ pp161-182 in 
Hughes and Liebaut supra n18 at 172 
122 Lord Bassam HL debates Col 1081 
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Immigration Officers are constrained by the Home Office’s Operation Enforcement Manual 
(OEM). The OEM makes express reference to Article 5 ECHR and specifies that, in order to be 
lawful, detention must be for a specific purpose under Article 5; for a reasonable period for as 
long as the purpose of detention remains valid; and, that the detaining authority should act with 
due diligence and expedition in effecting removal (or for whatever the purpose of the power 
is)123. The OEM also refers to Article 8 ECHR and the obligation to ensure that such decisions 
are proportionate to the legitimate aim of ensuring an effective immigration policy. In R (on the 
 to an immigration officer 
elsthorpe corroborates this assertion; one immigration officer stated: 
think they’re all very vague and it’s really the CIO at the end of the day who makes the decision .  
                 
application of I) v of SSHD [2002] Lord Dyson reasoned that detention must clearly be justified 
in all the circumstances of the individual case124. 
Whilst the objectives of the law governing immigration detention may be clear, such as the need 
to prevent absconding and thereby effect removal, the decision-making process itself is 
insufficiently prescriptive and there is a lack of statutory regulation. The organisation Bail for 
Immigration Detainees (BID) claim to have been aware of cases where procedures in the manual 
are not followed, including where an applicant had been discourteous
and where they had failed to complete particular forms and travel documents125. Research by 
G
..I decide myself. Yes there are criteria, but I don’t think they’re particularly clear or particularly helpful. I 
126
 
This discretion and absence of statutory guidance, makes it difficult for such decisions to be 
challenged. 
There is no maximum period of detention in the UK. The most recent Home Office statistics state 
that 1435 asylum seekers were detained on 31st March 2007 with Oakington accounting for the 
                                
w decisions to detain asylum-seekers are made at points of entry  
123 OEM Chapter 38.1.1 
124 EWCA Civ 888. 
125 BID Submission to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 2002 BID Part 4.2. 
126 Weber and Gelsthorpe Deciding to Detain: ho
Cambridge Institute of Criminology 2002 at 73. 
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largest proportion. However, the specific length of detention for adults is not recorded127. In June 
2006, 80 asylum seekers had been detained for between 6 months and 1 year and 45 had been 
detained for more than a year128. In some cases extended detention is blamed on the delay in 
receiving travel documents from the country or origin and in others, it is alleged that 
oids much of the uncomfortable detail. 
roup recommended: 
on a checklist133. 
                                                
administrative convenience plays a large part129. This was recognised by the Human Rights 
Committee in 2001130.  
There is clearly a lack of transparency evidenced by an absence of specific data. It is not known 
how many immigration detainees are still accommodated in prisons and data on the number of 
child detainees is difficult to obtain131. Whilst the Home Office’s website provides some of the 
data it only provides a snapshot on a particular day and av
Given the absence of specific data on the number of people detained and the length and grounds 
for the detention, the UN Working G
“national authorities should provide detailed information on relevant policy, practice and statistics 
in order to ensure transparency”132. 
The reasons for the decision to detain should be given in writing at the time of detention and 
thereafter at monthly intervals. According to rule 9 of the Detention Centre Rules of April 
2001,more detailed written reasons are to be given to detainees at monthly intervals. However, it 
would appear that this decision is often presented as a list of ticked boxes 
Research by BID suggests that the vast majority of detainees had not been given information 
consistent with the criteria in the OEM134.  
 
127 Home Office Asylum statistics 1st quarter 2007 Table 13. 
128 2nd quarter 2006 Table 13. 
129 BID supra n125 at para 4.9. 
130 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: UK and N Ireland UN Doc CCPR/CO/73/UK and 
CCPR/CO/73/UKOT 6th Dec 2001. 
131 According to the SSHD there were 67 minors detained with their families on March 22nd 2007 – Hansard 16th April 
2007 Col 461W. 
132 UN Working Group Recommendation 13, para 40. 
133 Home Office Operational Enforcement Manual July 2001 Chapter 38.6. 
134 BID supra n125 para 4.6. 
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The OEM contains separate rules for fast-track cases which were updated in February 2006. This 
procedure is designed specifically for cases that can be determined quickly – the detained fast 
track suitability list consists of countries which are considered to be generally free from 
persecution which can thus generate quick decisions135. Certain categories are excluded from the 
fast track mechanisms including those with age disputes, disabled applicants, pregnant women 
(over 24 weeks) and people with certain illnesses that require hospitalisation or 24 hour nursing 
care, those with criminal convictions (except where authorised), violent or uncooperative cases 
and those where detention would be contrary to published criteria136.In such cases the authority to 
the person already had 
mporary admission and has outstanding appeal rights exercisable from the UK. This is also 
detain must be given by the Chief Immigration Officer or a senior caseworker137 and a formal and 
documented review should be made after 24 hours by an Inspector and thereafter at weekly 
intervals138.  
The consideration of alternatives to detention, although advocated in international law, is not  
apparent in UK immigration policy. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights 
recently expressed concern that detention for administrative reasons in the UK may become the 
norm. He advocated more use of open processing centres with on-site accommodation for the 
efficient resolution of claims139. BID contend that despite the government’s intention to use 
alternatives to detention ‘wherever possible140’ there has been little research into possible 
alternatives and in some cases, decisions to detain are made when 
te
                                                 
135 Chapter 38.3.1 OEM On 27th Feb 2001 the Home Secretary listed the following nationalities as suitable for 
Oakington detention: Albania, Bangladesh, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, China, Iraq, India, Kosova, Latvia, 
stan, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe.  
.3. 
ner for Human Rights, Mr Gil Alvaro-Robles Report on visit to the UK 4th-12th Nov 
)6 para.66 
Lithuania, Nigeria, Paki
136 OEM Chapter 38
137 OEM Chp 38.5. 
138 OEM Chp 38.8. 
139 Council of Europe Commissio
2004 CommDH(2005
140 OEM Chp 38. 1. 
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emphasised in research by Weber and Gelsthorpe which suggests that there had been a goal-shift 
re was a reason to assume that they may not comply with the conditions of their 
process claims quickly and efficiently143.  Detainees have access to onsite legal 
many incidents of racism, physical abuse and incompetence amongst the employees of Global 
                                                
from the published reasons justifying detention to that of deterrence141.  
 
The Oakington regime 
The Home Office policy published in 1998 provided that persons liable to be detained under 
schedule 2, para 16 (1) and 2(1) Immigration Act 1971 were initially to be detained only to clarify 
the nature of their claim and ascertain their identity. Thereafter they were temporarily admitted 
unless the
temporary admission. From March 2000, the policy was changed in relation to detention at 
Oakington reception centre which had been established in order to process certain applications 
speedily. 
It was envisaged that most people detained at Oakington reception centre would be detained for 
around 7 days. Indeed, the Minister responsible assured the House of Commons that applicants 
whose cases were not determined within a period of ‘around 7 days’ should be granted temporary 
admission or moved to another place of detention142. According to Ian Martin, Oakington Project 
Manager, the rationale of Oakington was not centred on the prevention of absconding but rather 
on the need to 
advice and services unlike many other detention facilities where access to legal advice is often a 
major difficulty144. The weekly cost of detention at Oakington in 2002 was calculated to be £1620 
per person145.  
In 2005 the regime at Oakington was subject to a BBC undercover documentary which identified 
 
ct Committee on European Union, Minutes of Evidence  Memorandum by HM Inspectorate of prisons 1  
141 Weber and Gelsthorpe, supra n 126. 
142 Barbara Roche HC Col 263W 16th March 2000. 
143 Quoted in Saadi v SSHD [2002] UKHL 41 at 3137. 
144 HC Sele st
Feb 2006. 
145 HC Deb. 25 Oct 2001 Col 333W. 
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Solutions Ltd who run the centre146. An inquiry by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 
followed. The ombudsman accepted the findings of the BBC investigation and produced a critical 
report with many key recommendations for staff to follow147. Between April 2006 and March 
2007 there were 12 reported incidents of self harm at Oakington and the HMI report for 2006 
raised concern about the risk of suicide and self-harm as well as the lack of enforced procedures 
on anti-bullying and anti-racism148. The future at Oakington is uncertain; it was widely speculated 
that the centre would close by the end of 2006 yet it now seems that it has another three years to 
run. Following criticism from monitoring groups and the international community, women and 
families are no longer detained. In the 4th quarter of 2006 it housed 155 male applicants149.  
The limited period of detention at Oakington may be followed by temporary admission. However, 
it may also result in detention at an alternative institution and thus it is important to regard 
Oakington as one element in the system of immigration detention rather than a separate, specific 
institution dealing only with fast-track applications. In theory, detainees have been sifted before 
arrival, yet it is alleged that this is not happening and people who are victims of torture, rape and 
trauma who require detailed psychological evaluation are not receiving it150. 
The presumption underlying detention at Oakington is that applicants can be fast tracked with a 
view to speedy removal151. Indeed the most recent sets of statistics indicate that 100% of 
applicants had their initial application refused and of these one-third then appealed against 
refusal152. This absolute rate of initial refusal may be used to validate initial decisions to 
                                                 
146 BBC Detention Undercover: The real story 2005. 
147 Inquiry into allegations of racism and mistreatment of detainees at Oakington immigration reception centre and 
while under escort July 2005. 
148 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons Report on a short follow-up inspection of Oakington Reception Centre 5 – 7th June 
 2005 Amnesty international 
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detain153, yet caution must be exercised in assuming this conclusion, as it could equally be 
y, hurried decision-making. In the Saadi case all applicants were rejected indicative of poor qualit
at first instance and subsequently found to have credible cases.  
 
The Saadi challenge 
The decision of the HL in the case of Saadi and Others154 established that a short period of 
detention at Oakington on the basis of administrative convenience, does not violate Article 5 
ECHR. The decision was upheld by a narrow majority in the ECtHR and has  recently been 
upheld by the  Grand Chamber155.  
The reasoning employed in Saadi demands great scrutiny as it confirms a distinction suggested in 
Chahal v UK, namely that  asylum seekers have less of a right to liberty than those suspected of 
criminal offences and persons of unsound mind156.  
Saadi and others were Kurds living in the Autonomous region in Northern Iraq who fled Iraq and 
claimed asylum immediately on arrival in the UK157. The substance of their asylum claims need 
not concern us as all were eventually recognised as having a genuine need for protection by the 
Home Office (despite having their initial applications rejected). Dr Saadi had initially been 
granted temporary admission and asked to return to the airport on two occasions. He complied 
with these instructions but on the second occasion he was detained at Oakington reception centre 
for seven days. The view of the HL was that the detention did not have to be necessary to prevent 
absconding or actions against the public good and further, that all entry was unauthorised until it 
was expressly authorised by the Home Office and therefore, providing the action of detention was 
                                                 
153 This has been argued by the Home Office as justification for detention, Amnesty International Seeking asylum is not 
al UK 2005 at 62. a crime: detention of people who have sought asylum 2005 Amnesty internation
154 R (on application of Saadi) v SSHD [2002] UKHL 41, [2002] 1 WLR 3131. 
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156 For more on the differential treatment in the UK see Bacon supra n16 at 3 
157 The policy of return to the Kurdish autonomous area of Northern Iraq is discussed in the seminar by ILPA and 
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proportionate, the detention fell within the exceptions listed in Art 5(1)f ECHR158. The HL placed 
great emphasis on the ability of a state to control its own borders within the limits conferred by 
statute and international obligations. Lord Slynn emphasised that the Article 5(1)f power is to 
‘prevent’ unauthorised entry and that until the state specifically authorised entry, the entry must 
be seen as unauthorised. The state thus has power to detain until the entry is formally 
authorised159. There is therefore no need to show that the individual was seeking to evade 
nt had done all that he reasonably could to report to 
Lord Slynn rejected the implication of necessity in the second limb of Article 5(1) and reasoned 
that both limbs required the same approach: 
If necessity for detention is to be shown, it is more appropriate to require it for someone who has been 
nd detained with a view to deportation because of his conduct here 
than for someone who has recently landed and who has never been lawfully here under authorised entry161 
 the application of the non-discrimination provision in Article 14. 
unlawful entry as they had applied for asylum as soon as the opportunity availed itself. In 
immigration control. Lord Slynn’s approach can be contrasted with that of Justice Collins in the 
High Court who reasoned that if the applica
the authorities and did not present a risk of misbehaviour, he could in no way be regarded as 
effecting unauthorised entry160.  
lawfully here and who is then arrested a
 
The HL declined to consider
However, they did find a breach of Article 5(2) as Dr Saadi was not informed of the reason for his 
detention for a period of 76 hours.  
 
The decision of the ECtHR 
Saadi is the first case where the meaning of ‘unauthorised entry’ is debated at length by the 
ECtHR. It is clear from the facts that none of the four applicants were attempting to effect an 
                                                 
158 R (on application of Saadi) v SSHD [2002] UKHL 41, [2002] 1 WLR 3131. 
159 p3142. For commentary on Saadi see Berkowitz, Nathalia “Article 5, detention of asylum seekers” IANL 2006 p20 
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referring to the “states’ ‘undeniable right to control aliens’ entry into and residence in their 
country”162, the Grand Chamber upheld the approach of the HL by concluding that until a 
asons for this margin of appreciation have not been specifically 
nd interests in particular the emphasis on national 
reasonably required for the purpose pursued166 
                                                
potential immigrant has been officially granted leave to remain, he has not effected a lawful 
entry163. He could thus be detained under Art 5(1) f as detention would be aimed at preventing 
unlawful entry. 
On the issue of necessity, the decision of the Court emphasised the need to subject detention 
decisions to close scrutiny. However, they felt that decisions to detain people who had uncertain 
immigration status should confer a broader discretion on states than detention under other 
paragraphs of Article 5164. The re
elucidated, but Cornelisse suggests that it may be a reflection of the Court’s assumptions about 
the relative importance of certain rights a
sovereignty and territoriality165.  
Whilst the Grand Chamber  recognised that detention must not be arbitrary, this could be 
separated from a requirement of necessity; 
To avoid being branded as arbitrary..such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely 
connected to the prupose of preventing unquthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and 
conditions of detention should be appropriate… and the length of the detetion should not exceed that 
it did not, contrary to the other exceptions in Article 5, have to be necessary. 
 
g Amuur v France App No 19776/92 of 25th June 1996  para 41. 
.65 
ration detainees in Strasbourg: limited sovereignty or a limited 
10 at 105. 
2008] para 74 
162 [2007] 44 EHRR 50 para 40 citin
163 Grand Chamber [2008] para
164 [2007] 44 EHRR  para 44  
165 Cornelisse, Galina “Human rights for immig
discourse?” 2004 EJML Vol. 6 93-1
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In applying these factors to Dr Saadi’s detention, it was found that the authorities had acted with 
good faith in order to speedily process the aplication and that this purpose of detentionwas closely 
connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised detention. Under the third criteria, the 
conditions at Oakington were considered to give no particular cause for concern167. 
This separation of arbitrariness from necessity leads to a false dichotomy; as Liberty have 
recognised: 
The arbitrary nature of such detention will be exacerbated if the Grand Chamber upholds the Chamber’s  
processed
view and gives states complete freedom to deprive all asylum seekers of their liberty whilst their claims are 
mption that all entry is unauthorised until expressly authorised undermines 
amber blurs the distinction between immigrants and 
sub-paragraph stipulated a purpose, the effecting of an unauthorised entry, which detention must prevent. 
and in order to detain  asylum seekers…there had to be something more that the mere absence of a 
 the approach taken by the HRC on 
e right to freedom of movement provided by Article 12 ICCPR. The HRC has held that an 
 of 
                                                
168. 
 
In addition, the presu
the status of people fleeing persecution. The international right to seek asylum is surely deprived 
of much of its meaning if its exercise results in a deprivation of liberty. Of particular concern is 
the fact that the reasoning of the Grand Ch
asylum seekers. Indeed, The UNHCR submitted observations following the initial ECHR 
decision  in which they asserted the need to maintain a clear distinction between those seeking 
asylum and ordinary immigrants169. Asylum seekers are entering in order to exercise a lawful 
right to seek and enjoy asylum and therefore should not properly be regarded as trying to enter 
illegitimately: 
Properly construed. Article 5(1)f should confer robust protection against detention for ayslum seekers. The 
Asylum seekers had to be distinguished from general classes of illegal entrant or those facing deportation, 
decision on the claim; the detention had to be necssary, in the sense that less instrusive measures would not 
suffice, and proportionate to the aim pursued170 
 
The Grand Chamber’s interpretation also seems at odds with
th
illegal entrant whose status has been regularised is lawfully within the state for the purpose
 
 Liberty and submission to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR Para 5. 
167 Ibid paras 77-78 
ention of AIRA Centre, ECRE and168 Interv
169 Grand Chamber [2008] para 54 
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Article 12171. Ophelia Field contends that this must apply equally to an asylum seeker who has 
been admitted to the asylum process172. Thus she observes a paradox whereby a person’s 
presence may be simultaneously lawful and yet, according to the ECtHR in Saadi, unauthorised. 
In this respect international human rights law, particularly Articles 9 and 12 ICCPR, appear to 
offer greater protection to that of regional protection. Unfortunately, neither provision was given 
ulkes, Kovler, Hajiyev, Spielmann and  Hirvelä 
 
articular they note the danger of assimilating asylum seekers to ordinary immigrants which sits 
at odds with the interpretation that asylum seekers are lawfully within the state’s territory under 
Article 12 ICCPR.  
They also doubt whether the fast-track detention process complies with the requirement of ‘good 
faith’. In particular they criticise the line of reasoning which suggests that the fast-track system is 
in the best interest of the asylum applicants: 
…to maintain that detention is in the interests of the person concerned appears to us an exceedingly 
n the end justify the means: no person, no human being may be used 
 echo the opinions of the earlier dissenting Judges Casadevall, Traja and Šikuta in that the 
ajority interpretation of unauthorised entry creates great uncertainty for all asylum applicants 
that have not received specific authorisation on entry; they may be liable to detention at any time.  
sential part of the assessment process in international soft law.In 
                                                                                                                                                
significant attention in the reasoning of the Grand Chamber.  
 
The Dissenting opinions of Judges Rozakis, T
Six judges presented a joint dicision which dissents from  the judgement on Article 5(1)f. Their 
opinions refdlect the concerns expressed by the Aire Centre, Liberty and the UNHCR. In 
p
dangerous stance to adopt. Furthermore, to contend in the present case that the detention is in the interests 
not remely of the asylum seekers themselves “but of those increasingly in the queue” is equally 
unacceptable. In no circumstances ca




Criticism is also directed at the lack of weight afforded to a consideration of alternatives which 




reality, the interpretation of the majority in both Chambers of the ECHR appears to be at odds 
with the international legal provisions and also with regional statements from the Council of 
Europe and the European Union.  
 
 
Further challenges under Article 5(2) and 14 
The Grand chamber upheld the decision of the HL and the CA by ruling, unanimously, 
that Article 5(2) was violated as Saadi had not been made sufficiently aware of the 
ncerning an alleged 
etary of State on the basis 
at the particular nationality has generated a significant number of breaches of immigration law 
or adverse decisions; or on the basis of intelligence information regarding the propensity of 
                                                                                                                                                
reasons for his detention. 
However, lamentably they declined to consider the argument co
breach of the non-discrimination provision in Article 14. This argument is crucial to 
understanding the detention process at Oakington which categorises people on the basis 
of their nationality for fast-track removal.Detention is typically justified by refence to a 
general assessment of 
 assessment of the credibility of applicants from a particular region – without adequate 
consideration of the particular claimant’s case. Indeed this is a key element of the ‘clearly 
unfounded’ category of applicants who find themselves fast-tracked for removal. It has also 
become a key element of EU policy under the new Procedures Directive.  
Under s19D Race Relations Act 1976, as inserted by the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants) Act 2004, it is possible for an immigration officer to use nationality criteria in order to 
subject persons to more rigorous examination; to impose conditions on entry and to detain173. 
These nationalities must have been specifically approved by the Secr
th
 
171 Celepli v Sweden HRC Case 456/1991. 
 n26 para 34. 172 Field supra
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persons of that nationality attempting to breach or breaching immigration control; or there is 
orrespond to 
nterests and proportionality. 
statistical evidence to show an emerging trend in breaches or adverse decisions by person of that 
nationality174. Thus the domestic law allows for differential treatment on the basis of 
authorisation by the Secretary of State. However, the domestic law must also c
international human rights law – in particular Article 14 ECHR which would require the exercise 
of such powers to be based on legitimate i
 
Beyond Saadi 
The ruling in Saadi can be limited to the specific process of detention at Oakington and other fast-
track processing centres. The confinement was considered neither arbitrary nor disproportionate 
given its limited duration and the conditions of the detention. Lord Slynn reasoned: 
if conditions in the centre were less acceptable than
doubt but it seems to me that the need for speed justif
 they are taken to be there might be more room for 
ied detention for a short period in acceptable physical 
conditions as being reasonably  necessary175. 
 
However, it is contended that if requirements of necessity and proportionality are not strictly 
applied to immigration detention, as they are with other restrictions on movement, states might be 
encouraged to extend the use of detention which would not need to be justified176. It seems a big 
leap to say that because detention under Article 5(1)f does not need to be strictly ‘necessary’, it 
can be undertaken for administrative convenience. Such an argument could lead to an exponential 
increase in short-term detention across Europe.  
Allowing administrative convenience to justify any deprivation of liberty, albeit defined as ‘short-
term’, seems to be a very dangerous precedent. Liberty has argued that neither administrative 
convenience nor a short duration of detention can be used to satisfy the requirement that detention 
is not arbitrary177. Cornelisse contends that any assessment of arbitrariness must include 
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inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of the law. Proportionality will 
be intrinsic to the assessment or arbitrariness178. In Daly179, the House of Lords adopted a three-
tage test in order to establish whether a decision was proportionate: i) the legitimate objective 
important to justify limiting a fundamental human right; ii) the measures 
raised by the Chief Inspector of Prisons, 
other removal and detention centres which are beyond the scope of this paper181. Yet, it is clear 
s
should be sufficiently 
designed to meet the objective should be rationally connected to it; and iii) the means used to 
impair the right or freedom should be no more than necessary to accomplish this objective. The 
legitimate objective is the provision of immigration control and the use of detention is connected 
to this objective so it becomes particularly important to focus on the third element which must 
involve a consideration of the length and conditions of detention. 
 
Detention conditions 
It is important that the length of detention and the conditions of detention should be separated in 
any consideration of arbitrariness. Detention conditions have been criticised at a number of 
institutions in the UK and Europe. Thus it is unfortunate that the House of Lords, limited by their 
supervisory role in judicial review, were unable to scrutinise the regime at Oakington when 
making their assessment of proportionality. It is evident that even short-term detention can have 
detrimental effects on detainees. Such issues have been 
Ms Anne Owers, whose report on five Heathrow holding centres found children and single men 
held together. It was observed that conditions were ‘dehumanising’ and that detainees were 
treated as ‘parcels rather than people; and parcels whose contents and destination were sometimes 
incorrect’180. There are many more acute concerns raised about the conditions of detainees at 
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from the BBC investigation, discussed above, that abuse and dehumanisation can occur in the 
comparatively brief period of detention at Oakington182. 
The parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights have been scathing of the process of 
detention for administrative convenience. They were particularly concerned over the possibility 
of detaining torture victims who may feel unable to communicate the full extent of their 
experiences to the authorities. This concern may be more acute with the accelerated, fast-track 
procedure which may deny applicants sufficient opportunity to reveal ill-treatment prior to 
detention183. The committee also criticised of the lack of judicial control in administrative 
detention and the absence of a maximum time limit; recommending that if detention is 
unavoidable the maximum period should be 28 days184. Concern was expressed about lack of 
appropriate medical provision in detention and the lack of information, including reasons for 
potential breach of Article 5, poor detention conditions have engaged 
detention, given to asylum detainees185. Furthermore, the Committee noted the failure of the 
Home Office to develop alternatives to detention186. In response to this criticism, the government 
emphasised the use of reporting procedures and the option of electronic tagging under s36 
Immigration and Asylum (treatment of claimants) Act 2004. It is submitted that electronic tagging 
may further criminalise asylum seekers and this is borne out by the fact that if the individual 
refuses to have a tag fitted they can be liable to detention and prosecution187. 
As well as constituting a 
Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. In Mayeka v Belgium188 a 5 year old girl whose mother had been 
                                                                                                                                                 
the detainees BBC News “Prison culture at asylum centre” 16th June 2004. June 2007, up to 100 detainees at Dungavel 
removal centre in Scotland were refusing food following the suicide of Kurdish asylum seeker. Specific issues included 
lack of legal representation and the indefinite time limit of the detention with a view to deportation (in some cases more 
than 18 months) BBC News “Food protest by asylum detainees” 11th June 2007 
182 See page 22. 
183 Joint Committee on Human Rights 10th report: the treatment of asylum seekers  2007 para 226. 
184 HL and HC Joint Committee on Human Rights “Government response to the Committee’s tenth report of this 
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recognised as a refugee in Canada arrived in Belgium to meet her uncle who was resident there. 
She was held in a detention centre largely occupied by adults with no support. She was refused 
permission to reside with her Uncle whilst her status was considered and was then removed to the 
of Article 3 were also found in Peers v 
 
                           
DR Congo with no family to meet her. This was held to constitute a violation of Articles 3, 8 and 
Article 5 (unanimously). 
In the Greek Case the European Commission found that political detainees had experienced 
overcrowding, inadequate sleeping and toilet facilities, insufficient food, recreation and contacts 
with outside world which could constitute a violation of Art 3189. The denial of adequate medical 
treatment may also lead to a violation190. Violations 
Greece and Dougoz v Greece 191.  
The CPT regularly reviews detention practices across Europe and has expressed criticism of the 
standards in several European countries192. The UK report focused particularly on those detained 
indefinitely under s23 ATCSA 2001 – a practice which has now ended following the HL decision 
A v Home Office [2004]193. The Committee noted that these individuals could not be removed as 
they would face ill-treatment or torture on their return thus they were in a legal limbo and their 
mental health had suffered dramatically as a result194.  
Amnesty International’s 2005 report ‘Seeking Asylum is not a crime’ contains interviews with
several detainees, including families detained in the UK despite having complied with all Home 
Office instructions195. Many expressed concern over the lack of information regarding the reasons 
and length of detention. Such complaints are equally applicable to short periods of detention; in 
                      
ustria;  CPT/Inf (2006) 9 23rd February 2006 describes conditions in Lithuania as ‘unacceptable’. 
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one case a torture-survivor and her daughter had been detained at Oakington for ten days196. This 
is clearly in contravention of international refugee and human rights law as well as domestic law. 
 
n  and for how long they may remain in detention198. Pourgourides’ research reveals that 
 p
199
ships and loss of social status200. This 
disengagement is fuelled by lack of regular information about process. The detainee will 
experience temporal and spatial disorientation as well as grief and anxiety – which leads to a 
          
As the applicant had claimed asylum immediately on arrival in the UK it would suggest that she 
had been detained purely on account of her illegal entry and notwithstanding evidence of torture. 
Pourgourides discusses several cases which provide an indication of the mental health effects of 
detention on asylum seekers. One Algerian man had been imprisoned on arrival in the UK despite 
evidence that he had been severely tortured when imprisoned for five months in Algeria. He had 
also been subjected to a short period in solitary confinement197. This experience had increased his
anxiety and depression and led him to have suicidal thoughts. 
The degree of anxiety is often intensified as people don’t know precisely why they have been  
etai edd
the average period of detention in 1997 was 154 days; longer than the average remand period. 
Whilst a significant proportion of asylum seekers were then detained in prisons she notes the 
inherent uncertainty of such detention coupled with the added complication of backgrounds of 
trauma, homesickness, guilt and nostalgia. Her conclusions support those of the Amnesty report: 
Detention results in severe psychological problems and is harmful to the mental health of detainees. It is 
abusive and inhumane. It recreates the environment of oppression, fear and uncertainty from which people 
have fled. In doing so, it compounds the stress they have endured, deprives them of their capacity to survive 
and creates new and ressing problems in host countries which are not currently being adequately dealt 
with . 
 
Domanski describes refugee camps as ‘total institutions’ whereby a person will undergo 
desocialization, including a breakdown of family relation
                                       
. 
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sense of nothingness and uncertainty and, ultimately a feeling of overwhelming powerlessness 
and insignificance201. These feelings will intensify the longer a person is detained and thus is 
that detention is a last resort which is confined to short periods where 
less challenging environment for the potential 
                                                
becomes essential to ensure 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective. In advocating an integrationist approach, Watters also 
notes the detrimental mental health effect of detention202. 
In the assessment of proportionality it is essential that these factors are fully appreciated before a 
decision to detain can be legitimately made.  
Alternatives to detention  
Whilst there is little research on the alternatives to detention in the UK there has been detailed 
research analysing the international position by Ophelia Field and Alice Edwards203. They point 
out the lack of data regarding non-detained asylum seekers who abscond which makes it difficult 
to assess whether there is a significant risk which could justify a detention policy204. However, 
the research also suggests that in destination states, asylum seekers are unlikely to abscond as 
they seek to be recognised as legitimate, lawful residents205. A study of 98 asylum seekers who 
were released on bail contrary to the wishes of the HO who believed they had a high chance of 
absconding found 90% maintained the bail conditions206. The evidence collated indicates that the 
provision of legal advice and support is likely to significantly reduce the potential to abscond207. 
The research demonstrates a wide range of potential alternatives which could be utilised by the 
state to maintain the objective of immigration control and security – the majority are likely to be 
far cheaper208 to administer and most present a 
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detainee. In particular, the only state-funded bail system – the Toronto bail programme which 
supports those with no community ties to raise bail monies would appear to offer an effective 
alternative in destination countries. Bail is only offered following an assessment and interview to 
scertain the client’s credibility and the program then operates a regular reporting mechanism in 
 ECtHR in Saadi rules that necessity is not a requirement for immigration detention212. 
                                                
a
addition to offering legal advice and support209.   
Field concludes that research is urgently needed on the question of absconding and alternatives to 
detention within the UK210. It is submitted that any solutions should seek to avoid further 
criminalisation of asylum seekers. 
 
Necessity: an essential component of proportionality? 
Ten-day detention without charge is not generally acceptable in the criminal justice process211. 
Detention on the grounds of mental illness is also narrowly defined and can only be legitimate on 
the basis of necessity i.e. when the person is suffering from a mental illness. Yet, the decision of 
the HL and
Thus, it is apparent that asylum seekers have less of a claim to liberty than others. The judicial 
supervision found throughout the criminal justice process is considered by the EctHR to be 
unsuitable in the immigration context. This separation of necessity from arbitrariness and 
proportionality is a cause for concern as it is not possible to conceive of these concepts in 
isolation. 
Fairness requires outcomes which are accurate, efficient and acceptable213. Whilst acknowledging 
that errors may occur in any system it is important that the margin of error is minimal. An error 
would surely occur if, as in one of the cases presented by Amnesty International, a torture-
survivor is detained on arrival in the absence of any particular concern that they would abscond or 
 
a. 
uspicion that a person may be connected with terrorist offences. 
209 ibid. appendix 1 Canad
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self-harm. Some commentators argue that the error can be minimised if the detention is confined 
to 7-10 days214. Yet a focus on the length of detention alone should constitute only one factor in 
g the immigration authorities. Yet we know 
migration law’216. The Saadi case 
an assessment of proportionality. If asylum seekers are detained primarily on the basis of their 
country of origin, without adequate consideration of their individual circumstances and the 
validity of their claim, there is a significant possibility that victims of torture and trauma will 
experience short-term detention which is more likely to have a significant detrimental effect on 
their welfare.  
We must consider whether such potential harm is proportionate to the need to ensure effective 
and efficient immigration control.  A key factor in this assessment would surely be whether the 
person is at risk of absconding or otherwise evadin
that Oakington is not regarded as suitable for such individuals. The Oakington regime is based 
purely on administrative convenience. Put simply the question of proportionality becomes 
whether 7 –10 days detention of persons who may have experienced torture or trauma can be 
justified for administrative convenience. Indeed, one could go further and ask is the short-term 
detention of any applicant justifiable on this basis?  
Although the length of detention is a key issue that is linked to reasonableness by the ECtHR in  
Chahal, detention cannot satisfy the absence of arbitrariness criteria simply because it is 
comparatively brief215.  A brief detention is not per se reasonable or fair. A deprivation of liberty 
has occurred and therefore the rule of law and human rights standard demand that there is 
adequate justification. It has certainly been the case that the ECtHR has paid ‘little attention to the 
fine print on proportionality and necessity in the context of im
marked the first opportunity for detailed analysis and the enumeration of specifics. Even if we 
accept that detention does not need to be necessary under international human rights law, it is 
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clear that it must not be arbitrary and that this includes an assessment of proportionality. It is 
submitted that a deprivation of liberty in the absence of an individual assessment of its 
appropriateness or need, does not satisfy these requirements.  
Detention can only be considered to be proportionate if it is rationally connected to the legitimate 
objective of immigration control. This is doubtful if we take a narrow view of immigration 
control and associate it with preventing the risk of absconding and illegal activities. However, as 
the ECtHR appears to afford a wide margin of appreciation to states to determine what 
immigration control requires, we may expect them to allow a broad interpretation on this point. 
Nevertheless, proportionality also requires an assessment that the means used to impair the right 
or freedom are no more than necessary to accomplish this objective. Thus we can see that 
necessity is not entirely irrelevant in the decision to restrict movement or deprive a person of their 
liberty. At the very least we would expect a consideration of alternatives to detention in the 
individual case, an individualised assessment of the need for detention and the health effects of 
detention. Amnesty International has described the decision to detain in the UK as a ‘bed-lottery’ 
hich is arbitrary in that it lacks considerations of necessity and proportionality217. This includes 




applicants had complied with all requests from the authorities218. As it is impossible to 
understand why some people are detained and not others with similar case histories, the 
conclusion must be that it is for deterrent purposes – apart from an increased vulnerability to 
detention of certain nationalities, the process appears arbitrary219. 
 
 
If there is concern over bogus asylum applications and the need to prevent abuse then we must 
acknowledge that non-entrée policies operate in an indiscriminate manner. Furthermore, non-
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arrival measures lock refugees to their region of origin which are also the regions with the largest 
number of refugees and the greatest refugee burden – therefore they act to ‘cement existing 
injustices’220. 
The UNHCR has been critical of the trend, particularly post Sept 11th 2001, to detain asylum 
seekers sometimes on a discriminatory basis depending primarily on country of origin221. They 
also emphasise that the necessary public support for the reception of asylum seekers has been 
hampered by the media and politicians tendency to conflate illegal migration with refugee 
movements222. The UNHCR return to this theme in the 2003 report which notes that despite the 
public sense of panic over illegal migration, the number of asylum applications had fallen the 
previous year in industrialised countries223. This pattern has since continued224.  
Whilst the numbers of people detained on immigration grounds is increasing across Europe, its 
use has become less targeted225. If left unchecked it seems likely that more states will opt for 
administrative detention and as the number of detainees increases so will the duration of the 
confinement. The consequences of this development should not be under-stated. More people will 
be locked up for longer periods226. This is reprehensible on both an individual and societal level. 
For some, detention itself will be traumatic and for others it will add to the trauma of persecution 
already experienced. In either event, it is unlikely to assist integration should the detainee be 
awarded refugee status. On a societal level, it furthers the perception of non-EU immigrants, 
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asylum-seekers and refugees as ‘different’ and Outsiders227. In so-doing it fuels intolerance and 
racism.  Asylum seekers are increasingly portrayed in the British media as ‘undeserving’ and the 
expansion of the detention estate has helped to fuel this view. Landgren argues that the increased 
use of detention ‘enhances the perception that there is something amiss with that group of people. 
It contributes to animosity towards asylum seekers as a whole’228. 
A brief period of detention may be viewed as a practical solution to the demands of immigration 
control229. It could also be argued that where there is no previous history of torture or trauma, a 
brief period of confinement may be proportionate and acceptable. However, this conclusion 
ignores the legal, social, moral and financial objections that can be levied at short-term detention. 
iew that asylum seekers are 
anitarian obligation owed to those 
so defer to the rule of law which requires any deprivation of 
                                                
Legally, detention in the absence of an individualised assessment of its suitability, is on shaky 
ground.  International soft law requires both a consideration of alternatives prior to detention and 
that a decision be based on both necessity and proportionality.  
Socially, the routine use of short-term detention, perpetuates the v
criminals. As noted by the dissenting judgements of the Grand Chamber and the UNHCR, the 
terms immigrant and asylum seeker are becoming blurred230. This causes confusion and increases 
hostility as the latter t becomes  misunderstood and marginalised231. 
Morally, if one accepts Gibney’s contention that there is a hum
fleeing persecution232, it is surely inappropriate to subject those people to detention where it is not 
strictly necessary. One could al
liberty to be based on narrowly prescribed, accessible criteria.  
Financially, the cost of immigration detention far exceeds the economic cost of allowing a person 
to live freely in the community. 
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There are no signs that the climate of restrictionism will abate in the near future. In 2007, the 
Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office published their strategy to build stronger 
international alliances to manage migration233. The strategy includes increased off-shore border 
 circumstances. Saadi was detained because of his Iraqi nationality and a 
ion for administrative purposes does not satisfy the tests of proportionality 
                                                
checks, much more emphasis on preventing abuse and controlling entry as well as a protection 
quota of up to 500 people year – surely an embarrassment given the number of people in need of 
protection and the rate of emigration from the UK. 
The ECtHR were keen to emphasise the requirement that detention should not be arbitrary. Yet 
arbitrariness, which includes a test of proportionality, must surely require an individualised 
assessment of necessity. It also demands a consideration of alternative, less intrusive, measures. 
The detention of Dr Saadi can not be viewed as necessary to verify his identity as he had 
consistently maintained contact with the Home Office and thus it is difficult to see the 
justification for detention. It certainly does not appear to be based on an individual assessment of 
his particular
presumption, which turned out to be inaccurate, that his case could be speedily determined. 
Therefore a consideration of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 5 may have been more 
appropriate.  
The ECtHR in Amuur recognised that while states may be legitimately concerned over 
immigration and attempts to evade immigration control this cannot be used to legitimise the 
denial of rights to asylum seekers as guaranteed by international refugee and humanitarian law234. 
Yet the decision in Saadi effectively endorses such a denial providing it is for a short period of 
time.The use of detent
and lack of arbitrariness. It is also entirely at odds with the view of the UNHCR that detention 
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should in principle be avoided235. The dissenting judgements of the Grand Chamber offer a 
pertinent conclusion: 
Ultimately, we are now also to accept that Article 5 of the Conevntion, which has played a major role in 
ensuring controls of arbitrary detention, should afford a lower level of protection as regards asylum and 
immigration which, in social and human terms, are the most crucial issues facing us in the years to come? I 
it a crime to be a foreigner? We do not think so236 
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